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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE DEATH PENALTY OF CIVIL CASES: THE NEED FOR
INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT & JUDICIAL EDUCATION WHEN
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY ILL
INDIVIDUALS

I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
The minute the ultrasound revealed that he was a boy, [I] decided to name him
after Christopher Robin in Winnie the Pooh. In anticipation of the birth, [I]
bought stuffed Tiggers for the nursery, a room the young boy would[n’t] see in
person [until years later] . . . . [N]urses whisked Christopher out of the
delivery room instead of laying him in [my] waiting arms . . . . The whole
thing didn’t happen until an hour before I was leaving the hospital. . .I had a
car seat and everything. I was already discharged when they said, “Sorry, he’s
1
not leaving.”

Angela Williams’s parental rights were terminated by the Circuit Court of
St. Francois County based almost exclusively on generalized statements about
her Bipolar Disorder2 and a two and a half year old psychological evaluation.3

1. Susan C. Thomson, About a Boy, ST. LOUIS MAG., Oct. 2007, at 158, available at
http://www.stlmag.com/media/St-Louis-Magazine/October-2007/About-A-Boy/.
2. “Bipolar I Disorder” is characterized by one or more Manic or Mixed Episodes, usually
accompanied by Major Depressive Episodes.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 382 (4th ed. 2000). A Bipolar II
Disorder is characterized as “one or more Major Depressive Episodes . . . accompanied by at least
one Hypomanic Episode.” Id. at 392. In other words, “bipolar disorder” is “any of several mood
disorders characterized usually by alternating episodes of depression and mania or by episodes of
depression alternating with mild nonpsychotic excitement.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 73 (2005), available at http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?
book=Medical&va=bipolar+disorder. The Mayo Clinic explains that “[t]he deep mood swings of
bipolar disorder may last for weeks or months. . . . Today, a growing volume of research suggests
that . . . many people aren’t correctly diagnosed [with bipolar disorder]. Left untreated, bipolar
disorder generally worsens . . . [b]ut with effective treatment, you can live an enjoyable and
productive life . . . .” Mayo Clinic Staff, Bipolar Disorder Definition (2009), http://www.mayo
clinic.com/health/bipolar-disorder/DS00356. “[Bipolar disorder] affects approximately 5.7
million American adults in a given year, or about 2.6% of the U.S. population age 18 and older.”
DIANE S. ASCHENBRENNER & SAMANTHA J. VENABLE, DRUG THERAPY IN NURSING 282 (Hilarie
Surrena et al. eds., Wolters Kluwer Health & Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins 2009) (2002). See
also NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER (2009), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
health/publications/bipolar-disorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf [hereinafter BIPOLAR DISORDER].
3. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 99–100 (Mo. banc 2007).
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The Eastern District transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri,4
which reversed and remanded, holding that an inquiry into a parent’s current
ability to parent was necessary before allowing for termination of parental
rights (TPR),5 and that strict compliance with statutory mandates is required
for TPR.6 It has been nearly seven years since Angela and Christopher were
separated. Today, Angela visits with Christopher approximately sixteen to
twenty hours a month in her home, plus one eight to twelve hour weekend visit
per month.7 In order for the judge to make a competent decision, a new
assessment of Angela’s current mental health, her current ability to parent, and
the potential for future harm to Christopher would need to be assessed, and
proper procedure would need to be followed.
At this point you may be thinking: “Isn’t it common sense that a court
needs to look to the ability of the parent at issue when deciding whether or not
that parent can adequately care for their child?” The Supreme Court of
Missouri’s decision—which may appear to most as a commonsensical ruling—
is actually a progressive move away from railroading mentally ill parents
through the child welfare system,8 towards requiring a more individualized
assessment of a parent’s ability to care for their child.
In re C.W. has far reaching implications for Missouri parents with mental
illness and will ideally prompt more courts to discard stereotyped notions of
individuals with disabilities as inherently incapable of being good parents.
Angela and Christopher’s story is an all-too-common depiction of how the
court system has failed mentally disabled individuals. However, their story
also gives hope, as it demonstrates that courts are demanding an inquiry into
individual ability and are casting aside sweeping claims of inability based on
disability.

4. In re C.W., No. ED 87800, 2006 WL 2728583, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006).
5. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102.
6. Id. at 98.
7. Telephone Interview with David Orzel, Angela Williams’s Attorney (Feb. 9, 2009).
This is substantial improvement from the visitation reported in the 2007 interview, reported in
About a Boy stating that Angela saw Christopher for two hours a week. Thomson, supra note 1,
at 160.
8. See generally In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Walking With Them:
Advocating for Parents with Mental Illnesses in the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 273, 280 (2003) (“While some substance abuse treatment programs now accept
mothers who retain custody of their children, there do not appear to be any inpatient mental health
treatment programs that permit mothers to enter a facility with their children.”). Individuals with
mental illness are not treated in their role as parents, but instead are only treated for their
conditions. See id. at 296–97.
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Research shows that “the number of families headed by a parent with a
disability has increased substantially during the past century.”9 “[M]any
women with severe mental illness . . . wish to experience motherhood and do
in fact give birth.”10 In fact, of the five million Americans diagnosed as
mentally ill annually, researchers estimate that as many as one million of these
parents have children under the age of eighteen.11 Thus, the implications of
state decisions to terminate parental rights on the basis of mental illness are
central to a significant segment of the American population. As a result, it is
vital that our court systems are educated to understand the special
circumstances of parents with mental disabilities and to adjudicate them
appropriately.
Three major problems have contributed to the countless and continuing
violations of the rights of mentally disabled individuals’ fundamental right to
parent.12 First, the legal protections for parents with mental disabilities under
state and federal law are insufficient. Further, the social stigma of being a
parent with a mental disability, generalized statistical data, age-old stereotypes,
and horrific news stories may affect court determinations about a parent’s
ability to raise a child based on their condition instead of their conduct.
Finally, insufficient judicial education of family court judges may contribute to
unequal or ineffective treatment of parents with mental disabilities in the court
system. As these problems demonstrate, a more informed individualized
inquiry is required before terminating a parent’s right to his or her child, and
judicial education is necessary to aid family court judges in weighing the
sufficiency of evidence presented.

9. Elizabeth Lightfoot & Traci LaLiberte, The Inclusion of Disability as Grounds for
Termination of Parental Rights in State Codes, 17 POL’Y RES. BRIEF 1 (2006) [hereinafter The
Inclusion of Disability].
10. Katherine A. Judge, Serving Children, Siblings, and Spouses: Understanding the Needs
of Other Family Members, in HELPING FAMILIES COPE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 161, 164 (Harriet
P. Lefley et al. eds., 1994).
11. JOANNE NICHOLSON ET AL., CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PARENTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
AND THEIR FAMILIES 4 (2001), http://www.parentingwell.info/critical.pdf [hereinafter
NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES]; see also Jung Min Park et al., Involvement in the Child Welfare
System Among Mothers with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 493, 493 (2006)
(stating that women with psychiatric disabilities are reproducing at approximately the same rate
as women without mental illness); see also Glennon, supra note 9, at 273 (“Yet, at least one
million parents of children under 18, and perhaps many more, have a serious psychiatric
disorder.”).
12. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

344

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX:341

II. TPR: THE DEATH PENALTY OF CIVIL CASES
Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) is the death penalty of civil cases.13
Once a parent’s rights to his or her child are terminated, that parent’s right to
care for, visit, or make decisions for the child are gone forever: the legal
parent-child relationship has ended.14 The parent cannot seek a modification
of the permanent custody order after his or her rights have been terminated.15
The child can immediately be put up for adoption and a biological parent may
never see their child again.16
Parents have a fundamental constitutional right to raise and make decisions
for their children under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.17 The United States Supreme Court has stated that “it is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.”18 Establishing a home and raising
children are “among the most basic civil rights, long recognized as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness.”19
13. See In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004) (“The termination of parental
rights has been characterized as tantamount to a ‘civil death penalty.’”); see also NICHOLSON,
CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 10 (parents have said that when their parental rights are
terminated, “the pain never goes away”); Joanne Nicholson et al., Focus on Women: Mothers with
Mental Illness: I. The Competing Demands of Parenting and Living With Mental Illness, 49
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 635, 635 (1998) (“[F]ailure as a parent contributes to never-ending
shame and humiliation.”).
14. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GROUNDS FOR
INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 1 (2007),
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundterminall.pdf [hereinafter
GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TPR].
15. See, e.g., In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 44–47 (Ohio 2006) (holding that a parent who
has lost permanent custody of a child does not have standing as a non-parent to file a petition for
custody of that child).
16. GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TPR, supra note 15, at 1.
17. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 66; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925) (“[The state’s law] unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. . . . [R]ights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State.”) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)); see also In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 12 (“A parent’s right to raise her children
is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the constitutional guarantee of due process.”).
18. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35); see also
Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (explaining rights included under the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Fourteenth Amendment “denotes . . . the right of the individual to . . . establish
a home and bring up children . . .”).
19. Dave Shade, Empowerment for the Pursuit of Happiness: Parents with Disabilities and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 LAW & INEQUALITY 153, 153 (1998). Shade goes on to
cite numerous examples of discrimination towards parents with disabilities including a case
where the California Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s determination that a man’s
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TPR is a clear intrusion into a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in
raising children without state interference,20 yet caselaw and journal articles
are littered with examples of how fear and stereotypes about the disabled have
affected their rights to bear and parent children.21 Even Congress, in passing
the Americans with Disabilities Act, recognized that “individuals with
disabilities . . . have been faced with restrictions and limitations [and]
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment . . . based on
characteristics that are beyond [their] control . . . resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society.”22 Today, disproportionately high
numbers of mentally ill individuals are losing their parental rights23 despite the
fact that child abuse and neglect among mentally ill parents is low.24 Mothers
with mental illness are “three times as likely as other mothers without serious

physical handicap was a sufficient reason for awarding custody of his children to his wife who
had not seen the children in five years. Id. at 159 (citing In re Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979)).
20. See Jonathan H. v. Margaret H., 771 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (TPR is “a
drastic intrusion into the sacred parent-child relationship.”).
21. The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to uphold a statute that provided for the
compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It
is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”). Justice Holmes is famous for his bold statement that “[t]hree generations
of imbeciles are enough.” Id. See also Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with
Disabilities Act to the Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities,
16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387, 387–88 (2000) (“[T]he underlying belief that persons
with mental disabilities should not reproduce and are inherently unable to provide proper
parenting to their children survives today.”); Shade, supra note 20, at 153 (explaining that the
right to a family is fundamental, but has been historically “violated, abused or just ignored for
people with disabilities”); Joanne Nicholson et al., State Policies and Programs That Address the
Needs of Mentally Ill Mothers in the Public Sector, 44 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 484,
484 (1993) (“Sexuality, birth control, and abortion are controversial areas in the care of chronic
mentally ill patients, who are often thought to be unable to make decisions about their behavior,
health care, and treatment.”).
22. Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006).
“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and,
despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” § 12101(a)(2).
23. See The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 1 (citing a 1994-1995 National Health
Interview Survey-Disability Supplement study stating “only 51% of parents with intellectual
and/or developmental disabilities were currently living with their children . . .”).
24. Judge, supra note 11, at 164; see also JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL
HEALTH LAW, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 2
n.3 (2008) (citing Judge, supra note 11), http://www.bazelon.org/pdf/TPRpaper5-08.pdf
[hereinafter BAZELON]; NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that the
general public assumes that parents who have mental illness abuse or neglect their children, but
that these high profile incidents are rare); Park, supra note 12, at 493.
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mental illness to have come to the attention of the child welfare system or to
have lost custody of their children.”25 In 1994, mentally ill parents made up
twenty-two percent of parents involved in child welfare systems nationwide.26
Reports of parents with mental illness losing their children have reached rates
as high as seventy to eighty percent.27
“In many states, the diagnosis of mental illness alone justifies the removal
of children from their parents’ care, and the termination of parental rights.”28
Missouri is one of thirty-seven states that allow termination of parental rights
for disability-related reasons, including a parent’s mental condition or illness.29
Many states have specifically ruled that mental disability alone is insufficient
to interfere with the parent-child relationship, and the majority of state codes
specify that the disability must impact the parent’s ability to care for his or her
child, or that the court should take the parent’s condition into consideration in
determining whether a person is unfit to parent.30
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri
have held that “the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child
to the State.”31 Despite these rulings, studies have shown that state statutes
improperly “emphasize disability status rather than behavior” in TPR
proceedings.32

25. Park, supra note 12, at 496 (“[H]aving experienced a psychiatric inpatient episode . . .
conferred a twofold higher risk of involvement in the child welfare system and a nearly threefold
higher risk of having a child placed in out-of-home-care.”).
26. Glennon, supra note 11, at 277 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, NATIONAL STUDY OF PROTECTIVE, PREVENTIVE, AND REUNIFICATION
SERVICES DELIVERED TO CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1997), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/97natstudy/index.htm (now contained in U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PROFILE OF THE 1994 CHILD WELFARE POPULATION USING POINT IN
TIME DATA, tbl. 3-10 (1997), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/97natstudy/
profile.htm))).
27. NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 10 (citing Jill G. Joseph et al.,
Characteristics and Perceived Needs of Mothers With Serious Mental Illness, 50 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1357, 1358 (1999)); see also The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 1
(estimating that “40-60% of parents with developmental disabilities have had their children
removed from their care at some point in time”); see also Teresa Jacobsen & Laura J. Miller,
Focus on Women: Mentally Ill Mothers Who Have Killed: Three Cases Addressing the Issue of
Future Parenting Capability, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 650, 650 (1998) (“60 percent of
mothers with chronic mental illness do not raise their own children.”).
28. NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 43.
29. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 2, 7–10 (data as of August 2005).
30. Id. at 2.
31. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo.
banc 2004).
32. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 5.
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III. MISSOURI TPR LAW
In Missouri, mental illness does not per se render a parent unfit or justify,
by itself, a judicial determination of neglect or abuse.33 In order to terminate
parental rights, a trial court must first find the existence of at least one statutory
ground for TPR and also find that TPR is in the child’s best interest.34
Missouri Revised Statute 211.447.5(2)(a) states that one factor the court can
consider is the mental health of the parent:
The juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to terminate the parental
rights of the child’s parent when it appears that . . . [t]he child has been abused
or neglected. In determining whether to terminate parental rights pursuant to
this subdivision, the court shall consider . . . [a] mental condition which is
shown by competent evidence either to be permanent or such that there is no
reasonable likelihood that the condition can be reversed and which renders the
parent unable to knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and
35
control . . . .

The Supreme Court of Missouri has interpreted this statute as a three pronged
test to terminate parental rights for a mental or emotional condition:
1. Documentation: [Is the condition] supported by competent evidence;
2. Duration: [Is the condition] permanent or such that there is no
reasonable likelihood that it can be reversed; and
3. Severity of Effect: [Is the condition] so severe as to render the parent
unable to knowingly provide the child necessary care, custody and
control.36
TPR statutes are “strictly construed in favor of the parent and preservation
of the natural parent-child relationship.”37 Thus, before a state may sever
parental rights, due process requires that a state support its allegations by at
33. See, e.g., In re A.M.F., 140 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re C.P.B., 641
S.W.2d 456, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“Unlike neglect, abandonment, abuse, or nonsupport, the
mental illness of a parent is not per se harmful to a child.”).
34. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5 (2008). Note that the case law discusses section 211.447.4
in connection with the juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to terminate parental
rights. However, amendments to the statute have changed the section number to 211.447.5.
(There were no substantive changes to the statutory provisions stemming from the amendments;
only the section number changed). See, e.g., In re E.L.B., 103 S.W.3d 774, 776 (Mo. banc 2003).
35. § 211.447.5(2)(a) (emphasis added); see also In re J.K., 38 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001) (upholding termination of mother’s parental rights where the mother’s mental
condition – Battered Women’s Syndrome – was harmful to the children and unlikely to be
remedied in the near future).
36. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Mo. banc 2004). The Court recognized that a cited
condition of a parent must be severe enough to constitute abuse or neglect in order to TPR and
that “[s]ome parental conduct will harm a child without constituting abuse or neglect.” Id. at 11.
37. Id. at 12 (citing In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo. banc 1984)).
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least clear and convincing evidence.38 To terminate a parent’s parental rights
due to mental illness, it must be shown that the child was harmed or is likely to
be harmed in the future.39 Parental rights may not be severed simply because a
child would be “better off” in another home.40 TPR in Missouri “requires a
showing of more than merely the presence of mental or emotional instability or
problems; the incapacity must be so severe that it renders the parent incapable
of providing minimally acceptable care and the condition cannot be reversed or
improved in a reasonable time.”41
A court must look to the parent’s current ability to parent in determining
whether or not TPR is appropriate; the court must further “determine that the
parent is currently unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship.”42 A
court should look to both past and present conduct in determining whether or
not TPR is appropriate.43 A charge of abuse or neglect must be based on
parental behavior at the time of termination, not just at the time the juvenile
court initially took jurisdiction.44 While no actual abuse needs to occur for a
court to grant a request for TPR,45 one or more statutory grounds under Section
211.447 subsection 2, 3, or 4 must exist before the court may inquire into the
best interests of the child.46

38. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982); § 211.447.6; see also In re Adoption
of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d at 454 (“[C]lear, cogent and convincing standard of proof is met when the
evidence ‘instantly tilt[s] the scales in the affirmative when weighted against the evidence in
opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is
true.’”) (quoting In re O’Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
39. In re A.M.F., 140 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); see also In re D.L.M., 31
S.W.3d 64, 69–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
40. In re D.C.H., 835 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); see also Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes
a ‘better’ decision could be made.”).
41. In re S.M.H., 160 S.W.3d 355, 371 (Mo. banc 2005).
42. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 20–
21 (Mo. banc 2004)) (emphasis added).
43. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 9–10 (“Past behavior can support grounds for termination,
but only if it is convincingly linked to predicted future behavior.”).
44. Id. at 10.
45. See In re M.H., 859 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that a parent’s rights
may be terminated even if there is not conclusive evidence as to how a child’s injury was caused
– as long as the injuries occurred while the child was in parent’s custody); In re M.W.S., 160
S.W.3d 435, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“Contrary to Mother’s argument on appeal, a termination
of parental rights under Section 211.447.4(2) does not require proof that the child has actually
suffered abuse or neglect as a result of the parent’s mental condition.”).
46. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.6 (2008).
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IV. FOR EXAMPLE: IN RE C.W.
47

In In re C.W., the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the Circuit Court
of St. Francois County and held that a mother with Bipolar Disorder could not
have her parental rights terminated without an inquiry into her current ability
to parent.48 Angela Jean Williams gave birth to Christopher Robin Williams
on June 19, 2003.49 Christopher was born with special needs stemming from
his cleft palate50 and micrognathia,51 requiring him to be fed with special
nipples and bottles.52 A neonatologist at the hospital “hotlined”53 the Missouri
Department of Social Services, and reported that Angela “did not follow
through with feedings. . .and [had] a significant clinical psychiatric diagnosis
which impaired [her] ability to take care of Christopher.”54 Five days after
Christopher’s birth, Missouri’s Children’s Division removed Christopher from
Angela’s care, basing the removal on “concerns that [Angela] could not
adequately care for [Christopher] given his special needs and [Angela’s]
Bipolar Disorder and mild cerebral palsy.”55 The juvenile court judge ordered
that Christopher be placed in foster care and required Angela to participate in
mental health counseling to receive parenting classes.56 Further, the court
ordered that Angela receive a psychological evaluation.57 The psychologist,
Dr. Walker, concluded in her August 25, 2003 report that Angela was, at that
time, “not mature enough to care for her baby”, but that Angela may be able to
care for Christopher in the future if she “work[ed] through her issues.”58

47. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 93 (Mo. banc 2007).
48. Id. at 102.
49. Id. at 96.
50. “Cleft Palate” is defined as “congenital fissure of the roof of the mouth produced by
failure of the two maxillae to unite during embryonic development and often associated with cleft
lip.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1995).
51. “Micrognathia” is defined as “[a]bnormal smallness of the jaws, especially the lower jaw
(mandible).” ATTORNEY’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY M33 (West 1997).
52. Thomson, supra note 1, at 158.
53. A 24/7 phone center (The Children’s Division Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline) takes
calls from individuals reporting suspected child abuse or neglect. “Members of certain
occupational groups, such as teachers, social workers, and physicians, are mandated by law to
make reports to the Hotline. Any person may report, and anonymous reports are accepted from
individuals who are not mandated by occupation to report.” The Missouri Dep’t of Social
Services, Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline, http://www.dss.mo.gov/cd/can.htm (last visited Feb.
8, 2009).
54. Thomson, supra note 1, at 158.
55. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Mo. banc 2007); see also In re C.W., No. ED 87800
2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006) (“Due to Mother’s physical and
psychological conditions, it was concluded that she could not properly care for C.W.”).
56. Thomson, supra note 1, at 158.
57. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 96.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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In July 2005, the Children’s Division sought leave to file a petition for
TPR which was granted.59 On October 17, 2005, the Children’s Division filed
a “Termination of Parental Rights Investigation and Social Study – 211.455.3,”
and four days later filed a petition for TPR.60 Angela filed a Motion in Limine,
arguing that 211.455 required that the Children’s Division file a petition for
TPR before they order an Investigation and Social Study.61 The circuit court
overruled the motion and proceeded to trial.62
On February 3, 2006, the circuit court entered judgment terminating
Angela Williams’s parental rights.63 The circuit court determined that
termination of parental rights would be in the best interest of Christopher for
three reasons:64 (1) Angela abused and neglected Christopher;65 (2) Angela
failed to rectify the conditions which caused the court to assume jurisdiction;66
and (3) Angela was unfit to be a parent.67
Missouri Revised Statute 211.447 allows for termination of parental rights
when a child has been abused or neglected.68 Abuse or neglect can be shown
in various ways including a failure to provide necessary care for the child, a
severe act or recurrent acts of physical, emotional or sexual abuse, and
chemical dependency which interferes with the parent’s ability to care for the

59. In re C.W., No. ED 87800, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2006).
60. Id. at *2–3.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id.
63. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Mo. banc 2007).
64. Id. at 99–102.
65. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.4(2) (2000) (“The juvenile officer or the division may file a
petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parent when it appears that . . . [t]he child
has been abused or neglected.”). This section has been revised and is now section 211.447.5(2)
(2008).
66. § 211.447.4(3) (2000) (allows for termination of parental rights when: “[t]he child has
been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for a period of one year, and the court finds that
the conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or conditions of a
potentially harmful nature continue to exist, that there is little likelihood that those conditions will
be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, or
the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s prospects for early
integration into a stable and permanent home.”). This section has been revised and is now section
211.447.5(3) (2008).
67. § 211.447.4(6) (2000) (“The juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to
terminate the parental rights of the child’s parent when it appears that . . . [t]he parent is unfit to
be a party to the parent and child relationship because of . . . specific conditions directly relating
to the parent and child relationship either of which are determined by the court to be of a duration
or nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs of the child.”). This section
has been revised and is now section 211.447.5(6) (2008).
68. § 211.447.4(2) (2000); § 211.447.5(2) (2008).
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child.69 However, the circuit court in C.W. found that it was Angela’s mental
condition that rendered her unable to properly care for Christopher.70
The circuit court relied almost exclusively upon the testimony of Dr.
Walker and her 2003 mental health evaluation.71 Walker met with Angela
shortly after Angela gave birth to Christopher in 2003; Walker testified at trial
in 2006 that she had not spoken with Angela since their 2003 meeting.72 At
the TPR hearing, Dr. Walker admitted that she was not aware of Angela’s
current mental health status, and that the evaluation submitted to the court was
twenty-nine months old.73 Further, Walker testified the evaluation of Angela
was based on “generalized conclusions regarding the effects of Bipolar
Disorder and not any specific instance of neglect by mother.”74 Despite the
generalized testimony, the circuit court terminated Angela’s parental rights.75
Angela appealed to the Eastern District, and the case was transferred to the
Supreme Court of Missouri due to “the general interest and importance of the
issues involved.”76
V. THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI’S ANALYSIS
On transfer, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court’s
decision, finding that the evidence was insufficient to terminate Angela
Williams’s parental rights, addressing each of the trial court’s findings in
turn.77 First, the court addressed the State’s contention that Angela abused and
neglected Christopher. The court noted the significance of the twenty-nine
months between the doctor’s evaluation and trial.78 The court observed that
Angela underwent treatment, resumed her physician-prescribed medication for
her Bipolar Disorder, and complied with court orders to receive mental health
counseling.79 Also during that time, Christopher had corrective surgery for his
cleft palate, which lessened the need for “specialized feeding.”80 The Supreme
Court of Missouri concluded that the lower court’s findings were insufficient
to support a finding of abuse and neglect under Missouri law.81 The court

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
2006).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

§ 211.447.4(2) (2000); § 211.447.5(2) (2008).
In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99–100.
In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99.
In re C.W., No. ED 87800, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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relied primarily on the fact that the State failed to prove by competent
documented evidence that Angela’s mental condition affected her current
ability to parent.82 Generalized conclusions about Angela’s condition and a
two and a half year old mental health evaluation did not add up to sufficient
evidence to TPR.83
Next, the court addressed the lower court’s finding that Angela failed to
rectify the conditions that caused the court to assume jurisdiction. The lower
court used the outdated mental health evaluation by Dr. Walker to argue that
Angela’s mental health issues had not changed and plagued her ability to
parent.84 The lower court noted, inter alia, that Angela had not taken her
medication for her Bipolar Disorder for several months during 2004, that as a
teenager her “mental health issues were out of control,” and that Angela
“continues to deal with her mental health disorder and cerebral palsy.”85 The
lower court held that there was little likelihood that Angela’s mental condition
would be remedied “at an early date” to allow her to parent.86 The court noted
that a charge of failure to rectify must be based on a determination that the
child would be placed in a harmful situation if returned to the parent
immediately, rather than a mere finding that the mother still had a mental
condition.87 The Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately found that because
there was no updated expert testimony about Angela’s current mental health
status or a prognosis for future recovery, the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Angela failed to rectify.88
Finally, the court addressed the contention that Angela was unfit to be a
parent. The lower court based its finding that Angela was unfit on Dr.
Walker’s two and a half year old evaluation, Angela’s admission that she
needed help raising Christopher, and her failure to form a bond with
Christopher after two years of visitation.89 The Supreme Court of Missouri
noted that Dr. Walker’s dated evaluation did not establish that Angela was
unfit, nor did the fact that Angela admitted that she needed help caring for

82. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99–100.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 100.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 100 (citing In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Mo. banc 2004)).
Note: a parent seeking treatment may or may not be enough to combat a charge of failure to
rectify. However, “[a] parent’s efforts to comply with . . . a [treatment] plan will provide the
court with an indication of the parent’s likely efforts in the future to care for the child. . . . A lack
of effort to comply with a plan, or a lack of success despite effort, can predict future problems.”
See In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 10.
88. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 100–101.
89. Id. at 101.
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Christopher.90 Further, the court was not persuaded that Angela failed to form
a bond with Christopher.91 Angela attended all of her scheduled visits with her
son and was making efforts to bond with him.92 However, the court observed
that “it is almost a foregone conclusion that the bond between parent and child
will not be as strong as it otherwise would” when a child is taken from his
mother five days after birth.93 The court encouraged other courts to “take into
account this reality when passing judgment upon the bond between parent and
child.”94 The court held that there was not sufficient documentation to support
a finding that Angela Williams was an unfit parent.95
The Supreme Court of Missouri found that without current, expert
testimony establishing Angela’s ability to parent Christopher, there was no
basis to assess whether services would help Angela in parenting.96 Thus, the
finding that termination was in the best interest of Christopher was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence.97 Looking to what current
information they had about Angela’s parenting, the court cited numerous ways
in which Angela and Christopher’s relationship was growing.98 The Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings, as
the circuit court failed to establish a ground for termination and the petition for
TPR should have been filed before the investigation and social study.99
VI. ANALYSIS
Unfortunately, decisions like the circuit court’s decision in In re C.W. are
not uncommon, but are illustrative of a nationwide epidemic of courts allowing
stereotypes to inform their decisions.100 An individual’s mental condition
often clouds a court’s judgment and shifts the focus from the parent’s current
ability to parent.101 This is not a new problem: researchers and authors have
recognized that mentally disabled individuals have been discriminated against
and stereotyped for decades.102 We are aware of the problem – so why are
courts still treating parents with mental disabilities differently?

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id.
In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102.
Id.
See generally The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10.
Id. at 4.
See Shade, supra note 20; Kerr, supra note 22.
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A.

The Legal Protections for Parents with Mental Illness are Insufficient

Although there are protections for parents with mental disabilities under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),103 Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act,104 the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA),105 and the
14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause,106 rarely do parents raise such
protections in TPR proceedings.107 Instead of using federal protections in TPR
proceedings, parents generally rely solely upon state statutes, as “ADA and
constitutional claims. . .generally do not add anything to state law arguments
raised in such situations.”108 Unfortunately, however, state law does not
provide adequate protections for mentally disabled parents either.
1. TPR Statutes Contain Unclear, Outdated Language and Do Not
Sufficiently Define Statutory Terminology
A University of Minnesota study analyzing state TPR statues found that
“many states include disability inappropriately in their TPR statutes, including
using inappropriate, outdated terminology to refer to a person’s disability,
using imprecise definitions of disability, and often focusing on disability rather
than behavior.”109
Mental illness is an “ambiguous concept. . .which proves difficult to define
or quantify.”110 However, “mental illness,” the condition most commonly
103. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1994).
104. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
105. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C.A. § 629 (2003).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Bazelon, supra note 25, at 3–4 n.5. For example, Title II of the ADA protects disabled
parents’ right to participate in public programs, services, and activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(1994). Parents with mental disabilities often require such services to assist them in keeping
custody of their children. Bazelon, supra note 25, at 3. Unfortunately, many courts have found
that the ADA cannot be raised as a defense in TPR proceedings because: (1) the court finds that
TPR proceedings are not a “service, program, or activity” within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the
court finds that their jurisdiction is limited to state child welfare law rather than “an open ended
inquiry into how the parents might respond to alternative . . . services and why those services
have not been provided,” In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 721 (Vt. 1997), or (3) the court finds that Title
II provides an affirmative action, not a defense. Bazelon, supra note 25, at 4. Even those courts
that do allow for ADA claims in TPR proceedings generally do not find ADA violations. Id. at
4–5. See also Glennon, supra note 9, at 275 (“Almost all state courts to consider the question
have ruled that an agency’s failure to adhere to the ADA cannot be asserted as a defense to a
termination of parental rights proceeding.”).
108. Bazelon, supra note 25, at 3 n.5; see also The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 5
(stating that many state appellate courts have held the ADA inapplicable to TPR proceedings
because TPR is not a “public service, program, or activity” as defined by the ADA or because
TPR is based on the child’s welfare, not the parent’s).
109. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 5.
110. Harvard Law Review Association, Sixth Amendment: Competency Standard for SelfRepresentation at Trial, 122 HARV. L. REV. 316, 323 (2008).
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included in state TPR statutes, is often left undefined or given an extremely
broad definition.111 Mental illness has been defined as a “brain disorder that
disrupts an individual’s ability to think, feel, and relate to others and their
environment,”112 though the diverse population of individuals with mental
illness makes the concept difficult to generalize.113
Missouri state statute allows for termination of parental rights for reasons
of mental conditions, but does not define what constitutes a “mental
condition.”114 “Mental condition” can imply either a mental illness or an
intellectual/developmental disability.115
Because “mental condition” is
undefined, a court can interpret it as broadly or loosely as it wants.116 Section
211.447 of the Missouri Revised Statutes attempts to clarify, stating that in
order for a mental disability to allow for termination of parental rights, “more
than merely the presence of mental or emotional instability or problems [must
be shown]; the incapacity must be so severe that it renders the parent incapable
of providing minimally acceptable care and the condition cannot be reversed or
improved in a reasonable time.”117
Under Missouri law, a judge must first find a statutory ground for
termination (e.g. “mental condition”) before subjectively looking to the best
interest of the child.118 Because Missouri statute leaves judges with discretion
to interpret “mental condition,” judges are able to exercise discretion in finding
the statutory ground and in analyzing the child’s best interests. While judicial
discretion is a vital part of the American court system, the judicial discretion in
interpreting “mental condition” essentially allows the judge to circumvent the
law. In theory, the judge could consider the child’s best interests in
conjunction with finding a statutory ground for termination (instead of finding
a statutory ground first and then considering “best interests” separately, as

111. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 3.
112. Krista A. Gallager, Parents in Distress: A State’s Duty to Provide Reunification Services
to Mentally Ill Parents, FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 234, 235 (2000) (quoting National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill, What is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, http://www.nami.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_Yourself/About_Mental_Illness/About_Mental_Illness.htm
(last visited Feb. 9, 2009)). Note also that Department of Justice regulations under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act has specifically enumerated “mental illness” as a “mental
impairment” for purposes of proving disability under the Act. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(B)
(2008).
113. RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 1 (2009).
114. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5(2)(a) (2008); see also Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra
note 10, at 8.
115. Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra note 10, at 3.
116. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515 (1880) (“It is the province of the courts to
decide causes between parties, and, in so doing, to construe the Constitution and the statutes of
the United States. . . .”).
117. In re S.M.H., 160 S.W.3d 355, 371 (Mo. banc 2005).
118. § 211.447.6.
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required by law). Unfortunately, societal prejudices exist in judges too.119
Allowing for discretion in both parts of the TPR analysis can lead to
inconsistent results and allow judges to predetermine the outcome of cases.
Some disability advocacy groups like the Disability and Parental Rights
Legislative Change Project (The Project) argue that disability language should
be removed from TPR statutes entirely.120 The Project seeks to “ensure fair
treatment of parents or guardians with disabilities in child custody and child
protection cases, while promoting the safety, stability, and well being of their
children.”121 In order to achieve their goal, The Project urges states to
explicitly affirm that their TPR statutes are not to be construed to allow
discrimination on the basis of disability.122 Further, The Project would require
that courts focus on parental behavior and not the parent’s disability.123
However, assuming that the thirty-seven states that currently include disability
language in their statutes124 do not remove the language entirely, a surefire way
to promote just outcomes in TPR cases is to demand a case-by-case analysis of
each parent’s current and future ability to parent without specifically focusing
on the parent’s mental condition.
Many parents fail to fit the ideal image of what society thinks a parent
should be. The law acknowledges that parents are not perfect and states that
parental rights may not be severed simply because a child would be “better
off” in another home;125 statutes are to be strictly construed to preserve the
parent-child relationship.126 Some state courts have gone so far as to hold that
“even where the parent-child relationship is ‘marginal,’ it is usually in the best
interests of the child to remain at home and still benefit from a family
environment.”127 Research shows that most criteria courts use in terminating

119. See Rachael Andersen-Watts, Recognizing Our Dangerous Gifts: Applying the Social
Model to Individuals with Mental Illness, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 141, 159 (2008) (“A
psychiatric label also has serious implications in family law, especially in child custody
proceedings and the best-interests of the child standards that are used therein. . . . [A] parent who
has been given a psychiatric label would benefit from the judge’s education on the many forms of
treatment that may be successfully used in order to cope with mental illness . . . .”).
120. E. LIGHTFOOT ET AL., GUIDE FOR CREATIVE LEGISLATIVE CHANGE: DISABILITY
STATUS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND OTHER CHILD CUSTODY STATUTES 1
(2007).
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra note 10, at 2.
125. In re D.C.H., 835 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 72–73 (2000).
126. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004) (citing In re W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452,
455 (Mo. banc 1984)).
127. Glennon, supra note 9, at 294 (citing In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Conn.
1983)).
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parental rights focuses on past and current parental behavior.128 However,
when courts focus on the parent’s mental condition, the court is looking to
“contributing factors[s] of the parent’s behavior rather than the parent’s
behavior itself.”129 The inclusion of mental illness or mental conditions in
TPR statutes tends to shift the focus of the proceeding from the individual
parent’s conduct to the parent’s generic mental condition.130
As demonstrated in the circuit court’s decision in In re C.W., undefined
statutory terms lead courts to focus the parent’s condition rather than conduct
and lead to inconsistent and unjust results in TPR proceedings. Although
further legislative clarification limiting judicial discretion (or removing
disability language) is ideal, at the very least it is imperative that courts make
individual assessments of each parent’s individual ability to care for his or her
child.
2. TPR Law Fails to Provide Standards Regarding the Nature of Evidence
Required in a TPR Proceeding
Missouri does not have statutory guidelines to help courts in determining
what kind of evidence must be presented to prove that a “mental condition” is
severe enough to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child. The State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that a mental condition exists,131
though expert testimony is not statutorily required. Does the State need an
expert to testify to the “mental condition” of the parent? If so, who qualifies as
an expert? A psychiatrist? A psychologist? A social worker? And how long
does the expert have to interact with the parent to assess his or her ability to
parent? A year? A day? An hour? Further, what are “minimally acceptable”
standards of care? Does that mean that the child just needs food, shelter, and
clothing? Or does it mean that the parent must maintain a healthy relationship
with the child? If so, what does a “healthy relationship” mean?
Statutes and procedures providing for termination of parental rights must
not be vague.132 Missouri’s legislature, however, has left countless questions
unanswered, leaving courts with excessive discretion in determining that a
parent has a mental condition which renders them unable to provide for the
care, custody, or control of the child.
The statutory vagueness in many TPR statutes is dangerous. It leaves
courts with vast discretion to determine how much evidence is “enough” to
inflict the death penalty of civil cases and permanently sever the rights of a

128. Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra note 10, at 4.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. MO. REV. STAT. § 211-447.6 (2008).
132. Rosemary Shaw Sackett, Terminating Parental Rights of the Handicapped, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 253, 260 (1991).
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parent to their child. Such discretion is inappropriately left in the hands of a
judge who likely has no specific knowledge about the condition at issue or its
ability to be effectively medically treated, and can lead a court to improperly
deem a parent to have a “mental condition” that inhibits their ability to parent.
Unless courts demand more specific evidentiary criteria to be met when
deciding to terminate a parent’s rights due to a mental condition, the danger of
elevating condition over individual behavior in TPR proceedings will continue.
In C.W., the circuit court cited Angela’s condition and past effects of her
condition as a reason for terminating her parental rights.133 The court changed
the lives of Angela and her son, admittedly based on what the “expert,” Dr.
Walker, described as “generalized conclusions regarding the effects of Bipolar
Disorder and not any specific instance of neglect by [Angela].”134 Had the
court taken a closer look at Angela Williams as an individual, as opposed to
looking solely to her “condition,” they would have found that Angela had
sought and received treatment and medication for her Bipolar Disorder.135
Additionally, Christopher’s needs were no longer as demanding, as he
underwent surgery for his cleft palate.136 Angela had complied with court
orders requiring her to receive mental health counseling137 and was taking all
of the right steps to prove herself as a capable parent.
Although the Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately got it right, the circuit
court’s focus on Angela’s condition rather than her behavior changed the lives
of Angela and her son forever and cost them both precious years of their lives
together. Shifting the analysis to an individualized assessment and requiring
more or different evidence of Angela’s ability to parent could have prevented
many years of disruption and heartache for the Williams family.
B.

The “Best Interest of the Child” Analysis should be Based on the
Individual Circumstances of Each Family

An essential consideration of any court in a TPR proceeding is whether the
conduct of the parent that has brought them under the court’s jurisdiction has
had or will have a negative effect on the child.138 If a court determines by clear
and convincing evidence that a parent has a statutory “mental condition” that is
either “permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
condition can be reversed” and that the condition “renders the parent unable to

133. In re C.W., No. ED87800, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2006) (“Due to Mother’s physical and psychological conditions, it was concluded that she could
not properly care for C.W.”).
134. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99–100.
135. Id. at 100.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 10–11 (Mo. banc 2004).
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knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and control,”139 the
door is open for the court to consider the best interests of the child.140 The
“best interest” analysis is a subjective analysis based on the totality of the
circumstances, allowing for a fair amount of judicial discretion.141
The mental health statuses of a parent and her child are intimately
connected.142 Research shows that children raised by parents with serious
mental illness have a higher risk of developing mental illness than children
raised by parents without mental illness.143 The risk of a child developing a
mental illness is heightened when a parent has Bipolar Disorder,144 an anxiety
Attention-Deficit
Hyperactivity
Disorder
(ADHD),146
disorder,145
147
148
149, 150
Being
schizophrenia, alcoholism or other drug abuse, or depression.
raised by a parent with mental illness can create a stressful environment for the

139. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5(2)(a) (2008).
140. See § 211.447.6.
141. In re A.A.T.N., 181 S.W.3d 161, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
142. Carol M. Anderson et al., Why Lower Income Mothers Do Not Engage With the Formal
Mental Health Care System: Perceived Barriers to Care, 16 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 926,
926 (2006).
143. Judge, supra note 11, at 164.
144. “Bipolar I Disorder” is characterized by one or more Manic or Mixed Episodes, usually
accompanied by Major Depressive Episodes.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra
note 2, at 382.
145. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 225 (3d ed. 1980).
In this group of disorders, anxiety is either the predominant disturbance, as in a Panic
Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, or anxiety is experienced if the individual
attempts to master the symptoms, as in confronting the dreaded object or situation in a
Phobic Disorder or resisting the obsessions or compulsions in Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder. Diagnosis of an anxiety disorder is not made if the anxiety is due to another
disorder such as Schizophrenia, an Affective Disorder, or an Organic Mental Disorder.
Id.
146. The essential features of ADHD are developmentally-inappropriate inattention and/or
hyperactivity-impulsivity. Id. at 41.
147. Schizophrenic disorders feature “the presence of certain psychotic features during the
active phase of the illness, characteristic symptoms involving multiple psychological processes,
deterioration from a previous level of functioning, onset before age 45, and a duration of at least
six months.” Id. at 181.
148. “The essential feature of Alcohol Abuse is a pattern of pathological use for at least a
month that causes impairment in social or occupational functioning.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, supra note 146, at 169.
149. Diagnostic criteria for major depression includes (a) one or more depressive episodes
and (b) no occurrence of a manic episode or hypomanic episode. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 369.
150. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, AACAP FACTS FOR FAMILIES
NO. 39: CHILDREN OF PARENTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.aa
cap.org/galleries/FactsForFamilies/39_children_of_parents_with_mental_illness.pdf.
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child and can cause the child to have adjustment and/or developmental
problems.151 Additionally, because of the social stigma associated with mental
illness, parents often choose to forego treatment to avoid having their parenting
abilities scrutinized.152
Despite the increased risks associated with having a parent with a mental
illness, the majority of children raised by parents with mental illness will never
develop the psychiatric disorder of their parents.153 In fact, research has
suggested that children are at heightened risk for psychopathology when taken
from their parents and put into foster care.154 Long-term separation from a
parent can result in a negative impact on the well-being and functioning of
both children and parents.155 Thus, removing a child from his or her parent –
in some situations – can ultimately cause more harm than good.
Although research shows increased risk to children in certain scenarios,
substantial empirical evidence has shown that mental illness affects every
parent in a unique way, as every parent’s situation is different.156 Thus, it is
essential that every situation be individually scrutinized when determining
whether ending the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child.
Even though Bipolar Disorder may cause sporadic shifts in Angela Williams’s
mood, energy, and ability to function, with proper treatment and services
Angela can control the symptoms, lead a normal life, and raise a family.157
The stigma of mental illness puts mentally ill parents at a severe disadvantage
in TPR cases, despite the fact that many individuals who have a mental illness
are able to lead productive and healthy lifestyles.158
Another stereotype that parents with mental illness are constantly
combating is that mentally ill individuals are inherently dangerous.159 Highly
publicized, sensationalized news stories of mentally ill parents abusing or
killing their children fuel the public’s perception that mentally ill individuals

151. Judge, supra note 11, at 164 (citing Marian Radke-Yarrow et al., Young Children of
Affectively Ill Parents: A Longitudinal Study of Psychosocial Development, 31 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 68, 68–77 (1992)).
152. Glennon, supra note 9, at 293.
153. Judge, supra note 11, at 164.
154. Jacobsen & Miller, supra note 28, at 650.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 650–51 (citing APFEL & HANDEL, MADNESS AND LOSS OF MOTHERHOOD:
SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND LONG-TERM MENTAL ILLNESS (1993)); J. BOWLBY, A
SECURE BASE: CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF ATTACHMENT THEORY (Routledge & Kegan Paul
1988); FA Rogosch et al., Determinants of Parenting Attitudes in Mothers with Severe
Psychopathology, 4 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 469 (1992)).
157. See generally BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 2, at 1.
158. Id.
159. Gallager, supra note 113, at 239. See also Glennon, supra note 9, at 292 (stating that
studies showed that mental illness “continued to carry a social stigma, and was perceived to be
linked to violent behavior”).
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are unfit parents.160 However, “the vast majority of mentally ill individuals are
not more dangerous than others in the general population.”161 As a result of
this misplaced fear, parents with mental illness have difficulty convincing child
welfare caseworkers that they are able to be good parents.162 Negative
perceptions about the mentally ill may blind caseworkers, causing the focus to
shift from preservation of the parent-child relationship to termination of
parental rights.163 The child welfare system as a whole has moved its focus
“away from preserving the biological family to providing children safety and
‘permanent’ adoptive families, despite the human cost of disrupting the child’s
original family.”164
It is important for courts to recognize published research that clearly
disproves stereotypes about the “certain danger” that parents with mental
illness pose to their children. By ridding the courts of bias through education,
parents with mental illness have a better chance at being seen as individuals
instead of stereotypes.
C. Judicial Education on Mental Illness Will Help Judges Interpret the Best
Interests Standard
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 15.05(g) states that “[e]ach judge of the
family court division . . . shall complete . . . a course of training in family law
accredited by this Court’s judicial education committee . . . . Each year
thereafter, such judges . . . shall complete at least six hours of continuing legal
education courses . . . relating to family court issues and law.”165 As of this
writing, however, there are no specific requirements that judges be educated
about mental health issues or how to appropriately adjudicate cases involving
individuals with mental illness.

160. Gallager, supra note 113, at 234. See, e.g., Jim Yardley, Texas Jury Convicts Mother
Who Drowned Her Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A23; Angela K. Brown, Psychiatrist
Says Yates Was Psychotic, WASH. POST ONLINE, June 29, 2006, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR200606062900411.html (last visited Feb. 9,
2009).
161. Gallager, supra note 113, at 239 (quoting HARRIET P. LEFLEY, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN
MENTAL ILLNESS 72 (Diane S. Foster ed., 1996)).
162. Glennon, supra note 9, at 291–92 (“These attitudes may make child welfare caseworkers
less likely to take steps to preserve or reunify families where parents have mental illnesses. Most
damaging to parents involve in the child welfare system is the deeply embedded belief that
individuals with mental illnesses are unpredictable and dangerous.”).
163. Id. at 274 (“Child welfare services are often ill-suited to the needs of parents with mental
illnesses, and their cases are managed by child welfare workers with little understanding of
mental illness . . . . Moreover, many child welfare caseworkers often have excessive caseloads
and few effective services to which to refer families.”).
164. Id. at 277.
165. MO. SUP. CT. R. 15.05(g) (2005).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

362

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX:341

Scholars have deemed judicial education regarding mental health issues
and the efficacy of alternative treatment programs as “haphazard.”166 Judicial
education on mental health often consists of a judge “absorbing expertise”
from information presented in court.167 This type of on-the-job training is
dangerous, as it does not ensure that judges are aware of the most recent,
highest quality data and may lead to inconsistent treatment of parents with
mental disabilities.168
Some Missouri courts have recognized the need for more specialized
education for judges dealing with mentally ill individuals. As of April 2003,
five counties in Missouri have Mental Health Court Divisions.169 The focus of
Mental Health Court has been on “root causes that contribute to criminal
involvement of persons in the criminal justice population.”170 The criminal
courts in Missouri have recognized that individuals with mental disabilities
have unique needs in the justice system.171 Thus, judges in Mental Health
Courts receive training on mental health issues of criminal offenders and take
an active, therapeutically oriented role in their treatment.172 Unfortunately, this
trend towards focusing on special needs of the mentally disabled has not
extended to family courts and, in Missouri, is available only in criminal courts.
Currently in Missouri there are minimal standards for judges in
determining a parent has a mental condition. No expert is statutorily required
to come into court to prove a mental condition. A social worker fresh out of
college, having had little or no special training in mental illness, is often the
individual doing the investigation and social study of the mentally ill parent.173
Judges may be given incomplete or incorrect information at trial. While
scholars advocate that case workers in the child welfare system must be

166. See, e.g., Jessie B. Gunther, Reflections on the Challenging Proliferation of Mental
Health Issues in the District Court and the Need for Judicial Education, 57 ME. L. REV. 541, 549
(2005).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 550.
169. Your Missouri Courts, Mental Health Court Divisions, http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.
jsp?id=310 (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (including St. Louis City Municipal Court, Jackson
County, St. Louis County, Greene County, and Boone County).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY
ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE,
SAN BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE 66 (Apr. 2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/
182504.pdf (“The judge deals and interacts with the participant directly, and assigns rewards and
sanctions as may be appropriate, including selective use of jail or changes in placement
options.”).
173. In re C.W., No. ED 87800 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2006) (stating that Lindsay Ulen, a recent social work graduate, was assigned to Angela and
Christopher’s case).
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educated about the mental illness, its treatment, recovery, and support
services,174 judicial education should also be increased to assist judges in
weighing evidence presented in court.
General continuing legal education (CLE) is required for judges, though
there are no specific requirements for training on mental illness.175 Two
national organizations, the National Judicial College176 (NJC) and the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges177 (NCJFCJ) sponsor training
programs for judges, as do many state programs. The NJC offers judicial
education programs focusing on managing cases involving individuals with
mental disabilities in an attempt to help judges “identify and assess individuals
with mental health disorders and employ judicial strategies to address them
effectively.”178 As of this writing, the NCJFCJ does not have any trainings or
conferences relating to mental illness scheduled (though traditionally “hot
topics” like drug court and domestic violence are addressed).179 Unfortunately,
mental health education is often overlooked,180 and Missouri judges are not
required to participate specifically in CLEs focusing on mental health issues.
As TPR is the most extreme of civil judgments for a parent and child,
judicial education must be correspondingly extreme. Some states require that
judges complete specific education courses for handling capital cases
immediately upon being seated on the criminal bench.181 These courses are
required before a judge can hear a capital case.182 Further, judges are required
to take follow up CLE “refresher” courses to stay up to date on death penalty
happenings.183 Trial judges should be required to participate in similar training
regarding mental illness and termination of parental rights before they can
preside over a TPR proceeding.
Judicial education about mentally ill conditions and effectiveness of
treatment is necessary to prevent inconsistent treatment and to promote
confidence in the outcomes of TPR proceedings.184 Although judges are
generally expected to be neutral arbiters, some juvenile cases give the court an

174. Glennon, supra note 9, at 298.
175. MO. SUP. CT. R. 15.05(g) (2005).
176. The National Judicial College, Managing Cases Involving Persons with Mental
Disabilities, http:///www.judges.org/planned_2009.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
177. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Training and Conferences,
http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/267/315/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
178. The National Judicial College, supra note 177.
179. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, supra note 178.
180. See Gunther, supra note 167, at 549.
181. FL. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.215(b)(10)(A) (2009).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Gunther, supra note 167, at 551.
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affirmative duty to enter a decree that is in the best interests of the children.185
While judges must ultimately defer to available expert evidence,186 requiring
judicial education on mental illness can assist trial court judges in weighing
expert testimony’s credibility and ultimately guide the court to a situation that
is truly in the best interest of the child.
VII. CONCLUSION
Individuals with mental illness are still people; they are not faceless
statistics, but are mothers, fathers, friends, and lovers.187 Individuals with
mental illness are able to hold jobs, take care of responsibilities, and maintain a
quote “normal” existence.188 Most mental illnesses, including Bipolar
Disorder, are treatable.189 However, stereotypes and stigma rear their ugly
heads when individuals with mental illness decide to become parents.
Currently, legal protections for parents with mental illness are insufficient
under both state and federal law.190 Fortunately, inconsistent results in TPR
cases can be avoided. Simply by using more precise terminology in statutes,
increasing statutory guidance and limiting judicial discretion in interpreting
“mental condition,” and calling for legislative elaboration regarding
evidentiary requirements necessary to prove duration and severity of mental
conditions, will enable trial court judges to look specifically to the parent’s
ability to care for their child rather than that parent’s generic condition.
In order to ensure that judges consider individual circumstances of each
family in TPR cases, it is essential that courts are aware of the risks and nonrisks of children raised by parents with mental illness. In many cases, benefits
of being raised by a parent outweigh the risks to the child stemming from
mental illness. Courts need to understand the research disproving stereotyped
notions of inherently “dangerous” mentally ill parents and acknowledge that
mentally ill individuals can lead healthy, productive lives. Finally, because
insufficient judicial education of family court judges may contribute to unequal
or ineffective treatment of parents with mental disabilities in the court system,

185. See e.g., K.O.H. ex rel. Bax v. Huhn, 69 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
186. Gunther, supra note 167, at 551.
187. See generally BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 2, at 1.
188. Id.
189. See Kristine Bell, Pennsylvania’s Act 21: The Legal & Social Implications of Allowing
the Juvenile System to Commit Sexual Offenders Indefinitely, 27 J. JUV. L. 56, 60 (2006)
(“[M]ental illness is a ‘biologically based brain disorder’ that can be treated.”); SAMHSA’s
National Mental Health Information Center, Mood Disorders, http://mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/
publications/allpubs/ken98-0049/default.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2009) (“Like other diseases,
mental illnesses can be treated. The good news is that most people who have mental illnesses,
even serious ones, can lead productive lives with proper treatment.”).
190. See generally Bazelon, supra note 25, at 3.
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the need for judicial education on mental health issues is necessary to aid
family court judges in weighing the sufficiency of evidence presented.
The decision in In re C.W. marked the Supreme Court of Missouri’s
commitment to casting the decades of stigma aside and assessing each parent’s
individual ability to provide for the care, custody, and control of their child.191
Unfortunately, Angela Williams has had to wait far too long to be treated like
an individual. The circuit court failed to look at Angela as a parent, and
instead regarded her as a condition or disorder.192 The circuit court relied on
appallingly outdated, generalized statements about Bipolar Disorder in an
effort to permanently sever the relationship between Angela and her son.193
Perhaps if the trial judge had been exposed to the literature regarding the
reasons that an individualized assessment is necessary and appropriate and/or
evidence of the effectiveness of treatment for Bipolar disorder, Angela and
Christopher may not have been separated for nearly seven years.194
In the fall of 2009, Angela entered into an out-of-court agreement with
Christopher’s foster family, granting the foster family guardianship over
Christopher.195 Pursuant to the agreement, Angela enjoys unsupervised
weekday visits with Christopher for approximately sixteen to twenty hours per
month, plus one eight to twelve hour weekend visit per month.196 Angela
receives mental health assessments quarterly, and continues to work to manage
her Bipolar Disorder.197 The guardianship agreement leaves the door open for
Angela to seek full parental rights in the future.198
Though nearly seven years of foster care and a rollercoaster ride through
the court system have made it difficult,199 Angela continues to work to build a
bond with her son. While the juvenile court still monitors both Angela and
Christopher’s guardians, hopes are high that the family court will release
jurisdiction in 2010.200 Judicial education paired with the Supreme Court of
Missouri’s demand for individualized assessments will ideally serve to prevent
191. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102 (remanding the circuit court’s decision to terminate
parental rights based on outdated expert testimony and improper procedure).
192. See, e.g., id. at 99 (describing the lower court’s analysis based on Angela’s past mental
health issues as the basis for removal of Christopher from her care).
193. Id.
194. See id. at 96 (stating that Angela and Christopher have been separated since
Christopher’s birth in June of 2003).
195. Telephone Interview with David Orzel, supra note 7. Because Angela and the foster
family reached an agreement out of court, the court did not make an indiviualized assessment of
Angela’s current ability to parent.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. Angela has expressed that she would only seek to terminate the guardianship if it is
something that both she and Christopher want in the future.
199. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 101.
200. Telephone Interview with David Orzel, supra note 7.
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this kind of drawn-out family disruption and to ensure fair process in future
TPR cases.
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